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Ana Marta González
Your reasons express your identity, your nature; your obligations spring from what your 
identity forbids … an obligation always takes the form of a reaction against a threat of a 
loss of identity.
(Korsgaard 1996a, 101, 102)
Introduction
By characterizing obligation as a reflective rejection of what threatens one’s 
identity, Christine Korsgaard introduces a suggestive approach to this normative 
concept. This approach is mediated by the notion of “practical identity,” which 
she first characterized in Sources of Normativity as “a description under which 
you value yourself, a description under which you find your life to be worth living 
and your actions to be worth undertaking” (Korsgaard 1996a, 101). She has basi-
cally maintained this approach in her more recent work focused on agency and 
self-constitution (Korsgaard 2009, 20). However, since obligations are usually to-
ward others, her account could seem too self-centered; that is, by explaining obli-
gation through identity, the other person enters the picture too late. In this article, 
I explore the way in which Korsgaard’s approach to obligation in terms of “reflec-
tive rejection of what threatens one’s identity” can be brought into harmony with 
the fact of human sociability, which accounts for our obligations toward others.
The problem arises because, if it is only upon reflection that we find that the 
other is a relevant part of us, such that hurting the other is akin to hurting one’s 
self, it is not entirely clear how to separate obligations toward the other as such 
and those toward one’s self. William FitzPatrick (2013, 42) has suggested that 
Korsgaard is unable to avoid this sort of “psychologization” of moral experience, 
and Stefan Bird-Pollan more explicitly pointed in this direction when he asked, 
“Is interaction really only with one’s own principle or is it with the other, actual, 
people who have their own principles?” (2011, 377)
To this objection Korsgaard might answer that for every kind of obligation 
(and not just obligations toward others), interaction is not primarily with a princi-
ple, but rather with parts or dimensions of oneself; this is the same sense in which 
Immanuel Kant explains obligation as resulting from interaction between homo 
noumenon and homo phaenomenon (Kant 1996 [MM 6:418]). Still, this alone 
does not entirely address Bird-Pollan’s point insofar as it does not explain why 
obligations toward others cannot merely be reduced to obligations toward oneself. 
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In order for that to happen, a further distinction is needed, namely, the distinction 
between the reason why a law applies to someone—for instance, French law ap-
plies to you insofar as you have French citizenship—and the object of a particular 
obligation ensuing from that fact—say, you ought to pay taxes in France.
According to this distinction, too, moral law applies to you, and you are sub-
ject to obligations, insofar as you are a rational being, but the specific content of 
those obligations derives from different circumstances, which impinge upon your 
humanity. Especially relevant among these are other people, who provide you 
with particular reasons for action that you find binding precisely because of your 
identity as a human being. Thus, being a physician provides a general reason why 
certain obligations fall to doctors, yet a particular patient in need provides the 
particular reason for going through with certain medical action; more generally, 
your identity as a human being provides the basic reason why you are receptive 
to the demands that the other’s reasons convey, urging you to act in a certain way.
From this perspective, our identity as rational beings can be viewed as a 
source of obligations toward others without losing the genuine sense of being 
obliged to/by others; it suffices to remember that no obligation becomes real un-
less a particular reason is provided, and others can provide that particular reason. 
In this regard, it should be further noted that, from a psychological point of view, 
the thought that others are expecting something from us very often constitutes 
more powerful reason to perform an action than when we think of certain actions 
merely as duties toward ourselves. After all, the other’s reasons are embodied and 
alive, that is, they enjoy a factual reality that our own “private” reasons—that is, 
the reasons we give to ourselves to ground a certain behavior—often lack.
Nevertheless, the compelling force that an obligation can exhibit due to a 
variety of psychological considerations is not as much of interest here as is the 
normative force derived from the intrinsic structure of practical reason. In effect, 
motives should be rational in order to be normative. As I will argue below, the 
very structure of practical reason demands the articulation of a universal prem-
ise, which our rational nature provides, and a particular one, which depends on 
various circumstances.
In this context, the noteworthy part of Korsgaard’s account pertains to her 
argument about “the shareable character of reasons.” Indeed, she has noted that, 
while in some cases the other can provide that particular reason, with his or her 
specific needs and claims, it is neither “your” nor “my” reason that obligates me, 
but rather reason in general—a reason that we can share insofar as we share its 
principles and are also knowledgeable of the particular reason in charge of bring-
ing those principles into practice in a given case. By resorting to the “shareable 
character of reasons,” Korsgaard is able to counter the previous objection about 
the self-centered nature of her account of obligation. Indeed, as I would like to 
argue, reason is neither self-centered nor other-centered; rather, it is the space 
where the self and the other can meet and find common ground.
In what follows, I will further analyze this argument about the connection 
between obligation, identity, and sociality. In order to do so, however, I would like 
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to start by stressing the fact that some sort of reflection is unavoidable in ethics 
because of its association with the very notion of human agency. On this basis, (i) 
I will resort to Aristotle to explore the kind of reflexivity implicit in the ethical 
relationships of justice and friendship; (ii) I will then resume Korsgaard’s account 
of obligation toward others as arising from our identity as rational beings, and, 
more precisely, (iii) from the shareable nature of reasons. With this established, 
we also need to address the opposite objection: (iv) What makes the other’s rea-
sons different from my own? What is it that makes my reason actually mine?
1. Reflexivity and the Other: Justice and Friendship according to Aristotle
The idea that the nature and quality of moral relationships with others de-
pend on the nature and quality of relationships with one’s self does not lack philo-
sophical support. According to Aristotle, “friendly relations with one’s neighbors, 
and the marks by which friendships are defined, seem to have proceeded from a 
man’s relations to himself” (Aristotle 1984 [NE, IX, 4, 1166a1–2]).1 Ethical re-
lationships with others—basically friendship and justice—are ultimately rooted 
in the sort of self-love that is proper to rational beings, which Aristotle explicitly 
distinguishes from selfish self-love (NE, IX, 8). Reference to the self can never be 
entirely bypassed: properly caring about ourselves is a condition for caring about 
others. Some sort of reflexivity—what can be called “structural reflexivity”—is 
embedded in every act of care.2 Yet, it is precisely the nature of this structure that 
we must understand. In this section, I argue that the reflexivity proper to ethical 
relationships is mediated by some sort of law, which we share with other rational 
beings.
While from a psychological point of view it is clear that we develop a moral 
conscience in interaction with particular others, understanding the very possibil-
ity of establishing relations of a moral kind requires—to put it in Kantian terms—
understanding the possibility of taking the other not solely as a means, but always 
also as an end. Thus, moral relationships require that we relate to others in terms 
that differ from those proper to instrumental reason—that we relate to others not 
in terms of master and slave, but rather as equals. This kind of moral relation-
ship is encapsulated in the idea of justice and, even more perfectly, in the idea of 
friendship, which culminates the features of freedom and reciprocity that are also 
characteristic of relationships of justice. This explains why Aristotle claims that 
“when men are friends they have no need of justice, while when they are just they 
need friendship as well, and the truest form of justice is thought to be a friendly 
quality” (NE, VIII, 1, 1155a26–31), something that is surely connected with eq-
uity (NE, V, 10, 1137b9–26).
Indeed, saying that true friendship “has no need of justice” is not meant 
to say that friends are unconcerned with the objective requirements of justice; 
rather, it stresses the fact that they usually exceed the requirements of that kind 
of justice. Along those lines, Aristotle considers injustices against friends as par-
ticularly appalling: “injustice increases by being exhibited toward those who are 
Practical Identity, Obligation, and Sociality  613
friends in a fuller sense” (NE, VIII, 8, 1160a1–6). For him, justice constitutes a 
dynamic reality that is intrinsic to every relationship and cannot be reduced to 
legal justice; the latter only represents an external measure that sets the minimum 
of reciprocal freedom required in human relationships.3 While the virtue of jus-
tice cannot be equated with friendship, it demands more than strictly abiding by 
the law. In this way, Aristotle’s approach to both justice and friendship suggests 
a dynamic continuity between them. Friendship can flourish between those who 
are just. In the meantime, however, there is a significant difference between them; 
that is, from the perspective of justice the other appears primarily as an “equal,” 
subject to the same law, and therefore endowed in principle with the same rights 
that one claims for one’s self; from the perspective of friendship, by contrast, the 
other is regarded as “another self.”4 In other words, while justice stresses other-
ness, friendship stresses identity—my friend is a part of me, a quasi-extended 
self. In this way, friendship makes room for basic solidarity to emerge, which 
does not cancel out the equality highlighted by justice, but rather presupposes 
it. Indeed, recognizing the other as an equal, as is required by justice, already 
involves comparison with one’s self, and hence a connection with the self. Such 
connection, however, emerges even more clearly when it comes to friendship, 
where it is closer to identity; Aristotle even says that, in perceiving his friend, the 
good man perceives himself (NE, IX, 9, 1170a32–1170b13; NE, IX, 12). The good 
man finds his reflection in his friend almost as if he were looking in a mirror. 
Interestingly, Aristotle speaks of “perception,” and not of “reflection,” thereby 
reducing the epistemic distance between friends. For our purposes here, we can 
regard this perception as a form of embedded reflexivity, made possible through 
reflexive habituation. By “embedded reflexivity” I mean self-awareness mediated 
through the presence of one’s friend; this kind of self-awareness evolves in the 
context of long-term friendships. Indeed, friends who have been acquainted with 
each other for a long time develop a peculiar knowledge of their own selves in the 
context of their relationship.
Now, I would like to suggest that such reflexivity is nothing other than the 
full development of what human beings first realize when they recognize the 
other as an equal, that is, as a person subject to the same law. Aristotle, of course, 
does not stress the fact that the recognition of the other as an equal is an act me-
diated by the law, but he does indicate that there is justice among those subject to 
the same law.5 While here he obviously refers to positive law (he does not usually 
talk about law in any other sense), an implicit reference to the mediating character 
of the law is already at work when he notes the possibility of friendship between 
master and slave insofar as the slave is a man. His argument goes as follows:
Where there is nothing common to ruler and rule, there is not friendship either, since 
there is not justice; between craftsman and tool, soul and body, master and slave … nei-
ther is there friendship towards a horse or an ox, nor to a slave qua slave. For there is 
nothing common to the two parties; the slave is a living tool and the tool a lifeless slave. 
Qua slave, then, one cannot be friends with him. But qua man one can; for there seems to 
be some justice between any man and any other who can share in a system of law or be a 
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party to an agreement; therefore there can also be friendship with him in so far as he is a 
man. (NE, VIII, 11, 1161 a 31- b7)
Conversely, the fact that master and slave can be friends, insofar as both are 
human beings, suggests that there is some justice between them because they 
“can share in a system of law or be a party to an agreement.” Being able to share 
in a system of law, therefore, underpins the development of justice and friendship. 
This is important in order to understand the nature of the reflexivity that both 
justice and friendship entail; in both cases, reflexivity is mediated by an implicit 
reference to the law, which signals that we are equals. This also means that obli-
gations toward others cannot be entirely traced back to obligations toward one’s 
self, at least not in an obvious sense. It is only through the mediation of law that 
the rational agent comes to recognize the other as an equal, as an end rather than 
a means, and as a source of moral reasons for action.
Insisting on the mediating character of the law is important to show that 
one’s idiosyncratic self does not serve as a criterion for recognizing the other as 
an equal; rather, it is the law, working in a particular self, that leads one to treat 
the other as an equal, that is, as another particular self under the same law. By 
formulating the problem this way, we find ourselves in Korsgaard’s terrain.
2. Obligations toward the Other as Derived from One’s Identity
There is an obvious sense in which obligations toward the other depend on 
reflection, that is, “if you are going to obligate me I must be conscious of you” 
(Korsgaard 1996a, 136). Yet, being conscious of you as an equal, and hence in 
a position to make moral demands upon me, requires a further step. In the pre-
vious section, I noted that reflection upon the demands you make becomes a 
moral reflection insofar as it is implicitly mediated by the thought of a law that 
impinges upon both you and me as human beings. We could also say that, in 
order to avoid making one’s obligations toward the other contingent merely on 
one’s self-conception, it is important to see the necessary relationship between 
whatever practical identities we may have and the moral identity derived from 
our rational nature, which Korsgaard describes as essential practical identity 
(Korsgaard 2009, 22; 1996a, 113–25).
There is a sense, of course, in which one’s obligations toward the other are 
contingent on one’s self-conception. After all, if a waiter is obliged to serve cof-
fee to a patron, that obligation is based on the waiter–patron relationship, which 
could disappear if the waiter quit his job. As long as he is a waiter, however, some 
obligations follow. In Korsgaard’s view those obligations can be accounted for as 
deriving from the reflective rejection of everything that one perceives as a threat 
to one’s identity (Korsgaard 1996a, 100, 113–25). This seems especially clear 
in the case of professional identities with definite boundaries and for practical 
identities that incorporate specific roles or tasks, that is, as a member of a family 
or citizen of a certain country, and so on. Otherwise, when practical identities are 
Practical Identity, Obligation, and Sociality  615
not so institutionalized, human beings feel the need to reflectively frame their 
actions so as to provide them with a certain structure, defining, in the process, 
their position and hence their obligations toward others. This framing is a matter 
of reflective judgment; if it is meant to specify an obligation, however, it is only 
because it manages to connect the situation at hand with the most basic require-
ments of our humanity.
To illustrate the above, imagine a train accident in which one passenger re-
alizes that she is the only person without serious injury; this realization leads her 
to conclude that she is particularly obliged to help other passengers. Of course, 
being ultimately moved to help other passengers is not based just on being the 
only uninjured passenger; being a passenger is a fleeting, ephemeral identity rep-
resenting just one of the premises that could lead to such a conclusion. Yet, this 
minor premise brings to light a deeper solidarity hidden in any concept of iden-
tity. Indeed, every time we attribute an identity to an individual—say, physician, 
lawyer, woman, American—we make him or her part of a group that shares in 
that particular identity.
Through this very act of attribution we create a particular reason for sol-
idarity, providing particular content that activates the major premise, which is 
implicit in any ethical action, namely, “a rational animal is moved to help her fel-
lows.” Usually this major, universal premise does not need explicit articulation; it 
operates silently, but efficaciously, through particular premises—in this case, the 
perception of injured fellow passengers. Both premises together naturally lead 
the uninjured passenger to a conclusion that reflectively informs her choice to 
help. This is what it means to have a human nature, after all. Indeed, if a rational 
agent is expected to consider human nature as normative, it is only because, upon 
reflection, she does not object to anything in that kind of natural impulse,6 which 
is ultimately rooted in a basic solidarity that is antecedent to conventional social 
differentiations. On the contrary, were the agent not ready to help her fellow pas-
sengers, she would certainly feel that she had betrayed her identity as a human 
being.
In my view, this reference to our humanity is implicit in every moral obliga-
tion. This is also the case for Korsgaard, insofar as she recognizes a link between 
the practical identities we happen to have and our rational, moral identity; while 
the former provides immediate incentives for action, only the latter contains nor-
mative force:
Unless you are committed to some conception of your practical identity, you will lose 
your grip on yourself as having any reason to do one thing rather than another—and with 
it, your grip on yourself as having any reason to live and act at all. But this reason for 
conforming to your particular practical identities is not a reason that springs from one of 
those particular practical identities. It is a reason that springs from your humanity itself, 
from your identity simply as a human being, a reflective animal who needs reasons to act 
and to live. And so it is a reason you have only if you treat your humanity as a practical, 
normative, form of identity, that is, if you value yourself as a human being. (Korsgaard 
1996a, 120–21)
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While the necessary link between a certain practical identity and our human-
ity is only discovered upon reflection, it is operative throughout; in valuing our 
own humanity, we begin to value other things (Korsgaard 1996a, 123). In Self-
Constitution (2009, 25), Korsgaard reviews the same argument: “In order to be 
a person—that is, to have reasons—you must constitute yourself as a particular 
person, and … in order to do that, you must commit yourself to your value as a 
person-in-general, that is, as a rational agent.” Indeed, to value our humanity in 
this way is to have what Korsgaard calls “moral identity,” which is “just like any 
other form of practical identity. To act morally is to act in a certain way simply 
as a human being, to act as one who values her humanity should” (Korsgaard 
1996a, 129).
Reflectively endorsing one’s own humanity provides one with basic reasons 
for action. Yet, in order to act, one must flesh out those reasons, which is where 
incentives that resonate with our nature and our practical identities come in. 
They represent the starting point of practical deliberation, but in order to decide 
whether a particular incentive should be taken up as a motive for action, one 
must ultimately ask, in a Kantian manner, whether one would be able to will the 
purported maxim as a universal law (Korsgaard 1996a, 108). It is only in this 
latter case that an inclination becomes a right reason for action, able to create or 
reinforce one’s identity in a way that is consistent with our humanity.
In Kant’s case, the possible universalization of any given maxim, or reason 
for action, would automatically be a mark of its moral permissibility. Korsgaard, 
however, introduces a distinction, which Kant’s work lacks, between the categor-
ical imperative as law of free will and the moral law, which specifies the full do-
main of that imperative. Accordingly, “only if the law ranges over every rational 
being … the resulting law will be the moral law” (Korsgaard 1996a, 99).
By adding this qualification, she is considering the possibility that a particu-
lar agent establishes as his or her law something like “acting on the desire of the 
moment,” which would in fact preclude the very notion of agency. Similarly, if 
“the law ranges over the agent’s whole life,” but excludes the needs of others, the 
possibility of becoming “some sort of egoist” arises (Korsgaard 1996a, 99). Thus, 
while the law that egoists impose upon themselves constitutes them as a partic-
ular kind of agent, with an associated practical identity, it is not a moral law; the 
identity that egoist agents create for themselves is not open to the requirements of 
others and they are unable to care for others as they care for themselves, that is, 
as equals subject to the same law. This indicates that only when the law that reg-
ulates human choices expands its domain so as to include all rational beings—as 
manifested in the third formula of the categorical imperative, the Kingdom of 
Ends—do we get a truly moral law. Once we arrive at this stage, it is clear that we 
may be obliged by others as much as we oblige ourselves because of the simple 
fact that in both cases we are obliged by the same law.
Now, following Joshua Gert (2002, 316), we might ask if this argument 
should be interpreted as saying that some agents’ practical identities do not in-
clude being members of the Kingdom of Ends, while others do identify with 
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this membership. If we consider that being members of the Kingdom of Ends 
is another way of identifying with our own rationality, this amounts to saying 
that egoist agents do not identify with their own rational condition. Yet, this is 
not exactly the case since they do identify with some form of rationality, albeit 
instrumental. Therefore, the problem lies in finding a way to “secure” a reflective 
transition from instrumental to moral rationality.
Bernard Williams doubted that an argument for such a transition could be 
made;7 from another, more existential perspective, Søren Kierkegaard thought 
there is no rational transition whatsoever, but rather only a leap of faith from the 
esthetic to the ethical stage, and from the ethical to the religious one. By contrast, 
Kant himself thought that a rational argument for morality exists; indeed, his 
entire moral philosophy revolves around it. Yet, he also thought that the transition 
from nature to morality is never merely a natural one; even if becoming a full 
member of the Kingdom of Ends is a process of moral education, achieving a 
moral character is never just a matter of natural progress, but rather a revolution-
ary step. As he argued, “that a human being should become not merely legally 
good, but morally good”—he writes in the Religion—“… cannot be effected 
through gradual reform but must rather be effected through a revolution in the 
disposition of the human being” (Kant 1998 [RGV, 6:47]).
Still, this revolution could be sustained on the basis that human beings are not 
merely natural beings for whom reason is just an instrument to satisfy otherwise 
particular natural goals. Rather, they are rational beings in a deeper sense, that 
is, beings capable of redefining their goals in accordance with the universality of 
reason, a fact that sooner or later they must reflectively endorse when confronted 
with other facts, including those related to their own human nature and social life. 
Now, if this is the human condition, there must be a way of showing that the re-
flective endorsement of the egoist’s identity contradicts our deepest identity. This 
is what Kant attempted to show when he argued that by endorsing his maxim, the 
egoist introduces a contradiction in his will (Kant 1997a [GG, 4:424]). Arguing 
from the second formula of the categorical imperative, Korsgaard conveys the na-
ture of this contradiction by showing that 1) whatever one chooses, and therefore 
values, implies that one is willing one’s person as a source of value, as someone 
whose value is not relative, but rather absolute, and 2) once one has recognized 
one’s value as an end, one becomes further committed to granting that value to 
other human beings.8 It is this second step that interests us here because, in ar-
guing in favor of it, Korsgaard departs from routine arguments in ways directly 
relevant for understanding the nature of our obligations toward others.
3. Shareable Reasons
According to Korsgaard, rational accounts of morality differ depending 
on whether they start from self-interest or from a moral conception of the self 
(Korsgaard 1996a, 132 ss).9 While the former usually refers back to Hobbes and 
shows how self-interest inspires reason to participate in a moral system, the latter 
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goes back to Kant and tries to show how a moral conception of the self gives 
reason to regard others as equally moral. According to Korsgaard, many of the 
latter accounts defend the transition from the recognition of one’s own value to 
the recognition of the other’s value as if it were just a matter of logical consist-
ency, that is, “since I regard my humanity as a source of value, I must in the 
name of consistency regard your humanity that way as well” (Korsgaard 1996a, 
133). Now, while this sort of argument differs from the attempt to derive moral 
obligations from self-interest, it shares with it a focus on private reasons because 
both are concerned with showing how certain private reasons that the agent holds 
give him reason to take others’ reasons into account and vice versa. In contrast, 
Korsgaard suggests that “reasons are not private, but public in their very essence”:
If reasons were essentially private, consistency would not force me to take your reasons 
into account. And even if it did, it would do it in the wrong way. It should show that I have 
an obligation to myself to treat you in ways that respect the value which I place on you. It 
would show that I have duties with respect to you, about you, but not that there are things 
I owe to you. But some duties really are owed to others: we may be obligated by others, 
I will argue, in much the same way that we may be obligated by ourselves. (Korsgaard 
1996a, 134)
As Peter Fristedt (2011, 537) notes, this argument is connected with Kant’s for-
mula of humanity because valuing our humanity is valuing our rational nature, and 
hence valuing reasons as reasons. While Korsgaard’s argument on this point has 
been an object of criticism (Cholbi 1999; Gert 2002), it is important to note that it 
is an argument about the nature of reasons, which are not just private psychologi-
cal acts issued by a particular agent; we should not forget that those psychological 
acts point toward an object that can be shared by other agents, and this object is 
also what we call “a reason.” Accordingly, “to act on a reason is already, essen-
tially, to act on a consideration whose normative force may be shared with others” 
(Korsgaard 1996a, 136). This is the cornerstone from which she argues for the 
recognition of others’ claims. In her reply to Bird-Pollan, she elaborates further:
I do not see how we can recognize the claims of others unless reasons are already, or 
rather essentially, public or intersubjective. If I am simply a being who follows my de-
sires, the desires of others will be nothing to me unless I happen to desire that their 
desires should be satisfied. If we were weakly autonomous, we could not recognize the 
desires of others as having a claim on us, because we could not recognize in others what 
we do not find in ourselves. A being that acts only on its immediate desires does not rec-
ognize the idea of a claim. Our ability to acknowledge the claims of others is essentially 
tied to our ability to make claims on ourselves: there is no intelligible route from wanton-
ness to autonomy through the claims of others. (Korsgaard 2011, 392)
Implicit in the preceding argument is the idea that our ability to recognize the 
claims of others is linked to the ability to obligate ourselves. Indeed, if we can 
recognize the claims of others, it is only because we can recognize claims at all, 
and, in order to recognize the persistence of the claims others make upon us, we 
need a sense of our own persistence. This is why Korsgaard develops an argument 
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about the persistence of the self in order to explain why others make claims upon 
us, saying that one can only obligate oneself by linking one’s present self to one’s 
future self; this link is the work of practical reason. By achieving this unity, one 
is in a position to interact with and recognize the claims of others:
We must learn to acknowledge the reality of others, to put it in Nagelian terms, and that 
is easiest (in some ways) with the near and dear (Nagel 1970). But as a matter of meta-
physics, I think that our encounter with the publicity of reason is more intimate than that. 
… I argue that reasons must be public in their normative force in order to bring unity to 
the self … the idea is that unless I recognize the normative force of the claims of both my 
present and future selves, I cannot hold my own agency together over time well enough 
to interact properly with others … whenever we act for reasons, we make claims even on 
ourselves: claims whose normative force is public, in the sense that they reach out from 
one moment or aspect of the self to another. That is what enables us to recognize the 
claims of others: that we see our own condition reflected in them. (Korsgaard 2011, 393)
In the above passage, Korsgaard develops an old idea (Korsgaard 1996b, 369–70) 
that is innovative insofar as she traces a parallel between the recognition of “our” 
future selves and the recognition of other selves. After all, if we can call “our” fu-
ture selves “ours,” it is only because we establish a practical relationship between 
our present and any “future” selves, which somehow is at the basis of the rela-
tionships we have with others. This should not strike us as completely unexpected 
because, as seen above, relationships with others, both in the realm of friendship 
and in the realm of justice, develop out of the relationship we have with our selves. 
Both in Sources of Normativity (1996a, 102) and in Self-Constitution (2009, 134), 
Korsgaard refers to Plato’s analogy between the order of the soul and the order of 
the republic, which we also find in Aristotle (NE, VIII, 11: 1161a10, 30). Arguing 
along these lines, she concludes, first, that, “in the same way that we can obligate 
ourselves, we can be obligated by other people and, second, that we have obligations 
both to, and with regard to, other living beings” (Korsgaard 1996a, 92).
In order to understand the latter point—our obligations with regard to other 
living beings—let us remark that, although Korsgaard resorts to Wittgenstein’s 
argument against private language (Korsgaard 1996a, 137–39), her intention is 
not to make an argument about language, and even less so to discuss the con-
flicting interpretations of those passages in Wittgenstein’s work, but rather to 
introduce an analogy with the intrinsic universality of reasons,10 whether they 
are conveyed linguistically or not. Taking this latter point into account resolves 
the objection Michael Cholbi raised when noting that “Korsgaard overstates the 
power of her hypothesis about the publicity of reasons, trading on an ambiguity 
between ‘sharing reasons’ by articulating them in a public language and ‘sharing 
reasons’ by having common ends” (1999, 494). In my view, the analogy with 
language is just that. Desires and emotions, not just words, can also provide the 
agent with incentives to formulate shareable reasons. When a person is thirsty, 
she can express her thirst in words or she can just look around for something to 
drink. Whoever is able to interpret those signs understands or shares the reason 
embedded in that behavior. This reason can also be embedded in an animal’s 
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particular behavior, although unable to articulate it. If the animal’s “reasons” are 
not entirely conclusive and normative in the same way that human reasons are, it 
is only because animals are not ends in themselves, that is, they do not possess 
their own reasons reflectively the way people do.
At any rate, the important point here is that reasons, be they my own or 
another person’s reasons, linguistically articulated or not, are essentially norma-
tive. Obviously this does not mean that every time someone voices or otherwise 
exhibits a particular reason we should immediately act upon it. As Fristedt puts 
it, “even while we feel their normative pull, we feel a greater normative pull from 
other reasons” (2011, 548). Indeed, before acting in accordance with another’s 
reason, one may need to take other reasons into account, including those de-
rived from our own subsistence. Balancing some reasons against others—their 
urgency, their content, and so on—is a matter of judgment. As in Korsgaard’s 
example (1996a, 140), you may call out to me, which is certainly a reason for me 
to stop and go to you, but I may have other reasons not to do so (interestingly, I 
am usually obliged to give some sort of explanation, and failing to do so would 
be considered wrong).11
The “intersubjectivity” of reasons is especially apparent in the process of 
shared deliberation, which ultimately involves the fact that all human beings are 
rational animals. As Aristotle saw it, rationality brings with it a deeper source of 
sociality that is particularly manifest in the phenomenon of articulated language 
(Politics, I, 2, 1253a7–18). Korsgaard also stresses this fact:
Human beings are social animals in a deep way. It is not just that we go in for friendship 
or prefer to live in swarms or packs. The space of linguistic consciousness—the space 
in which meanings and reasons exist—is a space that we occupy together. (1996a, 145)
Although Korsgaard argues this point in Sources by resorting to Aristotle, the 
rationale for it could also be drawn from Kant. Indeed, arguing for the shareable 
character of reasons amounts to arguing for the structure of morality that Kant 
uncovers with the formula of the Kingdom of Ends, which is meant to provide 
us with the form of a moral community that is able to overcome our “unsocial 
sociability” (Kant 2007a, Idea 8:20). For Kant, being moved by practical reason 
means acting according to a maxim that can be universalized (as required by the 
formula of the universal law) and aiming at an end compatible with that universal 
form—which, as the argument for the formula of humanity shows, explains the 
human capacity of setting ends for oneself. Taken together, both requirements 
lead us to explain the internal structure of the moral law according to the formula 
of the Kingdom of Ends (Kant 1997a [GG4: 438]).
Be it from an Aristotelian or from a Kantian perspective, by defending the 
shareability of reasons Korsgaard bypasses the problem of the derivative charac-
ter of obligations toward others, asserting that others are a source of obligation in-
sofar as they are rational; as such, they are sources of reasons that carry external, 
as well as personal, normative force precisely insofar as we are rational and able 
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to share in those very reasons.12 To the extent that one can understand what others 
are saying, one cannot fail to recognize their humanity, not only as a source of 
reasons for themselves, but also as a source of reasons for oneself.
This solution, however, immediately raises the opposite objection: if the 
normativity of reason is grounded on its intrinsic shareability, then what is it 
that makes the other’s reasons different from my own? What is it that makes my 
reasons actually mine? Is there nothing deeply personal about the reasons I can 
share?
4. Shareable, but Different, Reasons
Regarding these latter questions, it is important to keep in mind that reasons 
are advanced by and embodied in actual people such that being obliged by rea-
sons equates to being obliged by other people. From this perspective, answering 
the preceding questions means explaining the embodiment of reasons. It involves 
realizing that human beings’ rational activity is conditioned by empirical—bio-
logical, psychological, and social—circumstances. As reflective agents and hold-
ers of reasons, we are required to distinguish the universal validity of reasons 
from their particular and empirically contingent genesis. While recognizing the 
contingent source of the many particular reasons we hold, we also realize the role 
they play in the configuration of our own practical identity and in our engage-
ments with others. Being able to recognize those contingent reasons as our own 
and reflectively endorse them is a sign of maturity:
Contingency itself is something that may either be actively embraced or passively en-
dured, and this makes all the difference: the mature attitude is the one that actively em-
braces it, not the one that passively endures it. … Kant urges us to take things to be 
important because they are important to us. And this means that we must do so in full 
acceptance of the fact that what specifically is important to us is at bottom contingent 
and conditional, determined by biological, psychological, and historical conditions that 
themselves are neither justified nor unjustified, but simply there … Kantian agents trans-
form contingent values into necessary ones by valuing the humanity that is their source. 
(Korsgaard 1996a, 242)
The embodiment of practical reason presupposes that human beings’ capacity 
to set ends for ourselves, along with our capacity to ascribe to other human be-
ings the powers we discover in ourselves, are prefigured in our sensible nature. 
According to Kant,
[Man] has a character which he himself creates, because he is capable of perfecting him-
self according to purposes which he himself adopts. Consequently, man as an animal en-
dowed with capability of reason (animal rationabile) can make himself a rational animal 
(animal rationale). On these grounds he first preserves himself and his species; secondly, 
he trains, instructs, and educates his species for social living; thirdly, he governs the 
species as a systematic whole (arranged according to principles of reason) which belongs 
to society. (Kant 2007b [Anthropology, 7: 321–22])
622  Ana Marta González
Somehow prefiguring Korsgaard’s idea of “practical identity,” and in line with the 
ancient doctrine of oikeiosis, Kant depicts human beings as a particular animal 
that is endowed with the capacity for reason and that can turn himself into a ratio-
nal and self-conscious animal with a regard for his own dignity. Of course, much 
depends on whether we view ourselves merely as sensible beings or as moral 
beings (Kant 1996  [MM 6: 435]). Still, in speaking of “animals endowed with 
reason,” Kant stresses the fact that we share a sensible nature with other animals, 
which makes us receptive to the feelings of joy and sadness that we see in others. 
While those feelings alone cannot make an action, and much less a right action, 
they provide human reason with particular starting points for formulating max-
ims, which can be reflectively tested against the categorical imperative. Thus, 
even if sympathy alone cannot ensure that we treat others in accordance with 
their status as rational beings, it makes us receptive to their needs and reasons, 
inducing us to treat them as equals and treat the humanity of others as an end in 
itself, that is, just as we should treat our own humanity. This naturally involves re-
flection upon the material conditions of human life and what it means for human 
coexistence. Along these lines, Right constitutes itself in the basic condition of 
external freedom.
In the meantime, it is obvious that there are features of human interaction 
that cannot be reduced to shareable reasons, features that resist reason, sociality, 
and morality. Interestingly, we do not just find these features in others, but also 
within ourselves. Indeed, they constitute the basis for the moral law’s coercive 
character (Kant 1997a [GG 4: 413]; Kant 1997b [KpV 5:72]). Yet, along with 
these features, we find others that simply represent different practical standpoints 
from which to access the universality of reason. As Christopher Gowans (2002, 
564) notes, apparent resistance to reason very often simply derives from the par-
ticular way each person has of interpreting and realizing moral obligations; as 
noted above, there are particular ways of being in the world, different practical 
identities, which lead people to diverge on what they consider truly important in 
practice.13
Yet, such diversity does not represent the last word on human coexistence. 
Rather, it constitutes an invitation to search for a shared reason that grounds a 
new, higher sense of common agency.14 Now, as long as we have to coexist with 
one another, there is such a reason and such an agency. That common agency, 
which can and should be articulated around the fact of human coexistence, is 
what we call political agency. It is an agency that does not cancel out human 
diversity, but rather invites us to structure decisions and adjudicate between con-
flicting claims under the guidance of moral reason.
5. Concluding Remarks
Korsgaard’s account of obligation as a reflective rejection of what threatens 
one’s identity opens up the question of the other’s place in her account, namely, 
can the other be regarded as a real source of obligation for us if all obligations 
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derive from reflective rejection of anything that threatens our own identity? In 
order to clarify the nature of this problem, I began by stressing the role of reflec-
tion in ethics and, specifically, the peculiar reflexivity found in the Aristotelian 
account of ethical relationships such as justice and friendship. While Aristotle 
himself does not speak in terms of obligations, he does claim that ethical relation-
ships in which the other is regarded as an equal assume an implicit reference to 
a law. This can be interpreted as saying that the reflexivity implicit in justice and 
friendship does not involve referring the other to my idiosyncratic self, but rather 
to my rational self. This way of arguing brings us close to Korsgaard’s own posi-
tion, that is, the morally normative force we find in a contingent practical identity 
derives from our essential practical identity, that is, our identity as rational beings.
I have suggested that the interplay whereby contingent practical identities 
and moral identity engender moral obligations, which Korsgaard illustrates both 
in Sources of Normativity and in Self-Constitution, can be compared to the in-
terplay between particular premises and universal premises of practical reason in 
any practical syllogism. In order to be practical and generate an action, reason re-
quires the combination of a universal premise provided by our rational nature and 
a particular one that emerges from contingent circumstances. Moral obligation 
emerges when our identity as human beings is called into question in particular 
circumstances.
This being the structure of practical reason, Korsgaards’s main contribution 
to our problem consists in resorting to the shareable character of reasons as a way 
to defend our obligations to others on the same footing that she defends obliga-
tions to ourselves. Indeed, obligation as “reflective rejection of what threatens 
one’s identity” can be brought into harmony with the fact of human sociality by 
recognizing the deeply social character of human identity; human beings are so-
cial not only because they share in a sensible nature, but also because they share 
in a rational nature and in the reflective structure of consciousness.
Now, if reasons are shareable, others can share in my reasons as much as I 
can share in theirs. This means that moral obligations, whether or not they appear 
excessively self-centered from a motivational point of view, remain, in the nor-
mative sense, profoundly social. While in Sources Korsgaard resorts to Aristotle 
in order to argue this point, her position makes equal sense from a Kantian point 
of view since the shareable character of reasons is implicit in the moral struc-
ture of the Kantian formula of the Kingdom of Ends. Nevertheless, this deeply 
social character of obligation, grounded on the shareability of reasons, does not 
cancel out human diversity because there remains a difference between reason’s 
universal validity and its particular and contingent genesis in individual human 
beings. While mature moral agents realize the contingent source of many of their 
particular reasons, as well as the role these play in the configuration of their ra-
tional identity, they do not take those practical identities as ultimate principles, 
but rather regard them as different standpoints from which to develop a common 
agency under the guidance of moral reason.
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Notes
1See also NE, IX, 12, 1171b32–33. (Aristotle’s and Kant’s works will be cited as usual).
2In other words, it need not be a conscious reflexivity. This downplays differences between Kors-
gaard’s position and that of Martin Heidegger, which Steven Crowell noted (2007).
3Aristotle does speak of a kind of political friendship, which involves fellow citizens (NE, IX, 
1167b2–3). Yet, there is reason to argue that even this kind of friendship is not limitless (NE, I, 
7, 1097b9-14). He actually says that “it is well not to seek to have as many friends as possible, 
but as many as are enough for the purpose of living together” (NE IX, 10, 1171a9–10).
4NE, IX, 9, 1166 a 31; NE, IX, 9, 1170b6.
5“For what is just exists only among people whose relations are governed by law, and law only 
among those liable to injustice, since legal justice consists in judgment between what is just and 
what is unjust” (NE, V, 6, 1134 a 31-33).
6This is what Korsgaard calls “reflective endorsement of our nature,” a position that she ascribes to 
Shaftesbury and David Hume (see Sources of Normativity, chapter 2).
7In his reply to Korsgaard’s lectures, included in Sources of Normativity, Williams asked “1) How 
are the considerations about others relevantly activated in reflection, 2) How do they mesh into 
‘practical identity’ in such a way as to satisfy Kant’s requirement that one speaks to oneself, 
and under an identity which one does not ‘just happen’ to have? … even if there is (which of 
course I doubt) a consideration linking practical identity in a sense that is inescapable with 
acknowledgment of others in a sense that is morally sufficient, how can this link be mobilized 
normatively in reflection?” (Williams 1996a, 216-17)
8“To value yourself just as a human being is to have moral identity, as the Enlightenment understood 
it. So this puts you in moral territory. Or at least, it does so if valuing humanity in your own 
person rationally requires valuing it in the person of others” (Korsgaard 1996a, 121).
9While whether or not all rational accounts of morality fit into this division is up for debate, it is 
broad enough to include all the approaches that G. E. M. Anscombe characterized as “modern 
moral philosophy.”
10“Why shouldn’t language force us to reason practically together, in just the same way that it forces 
us to think together?” (Korsgaard 1996a, 142)
11The fact that one has personal reasons for not doing what another asks need not be explained in 
psychological terms. Although one’s own reasons— first originated from one’s own inclinations 
or practical identity—have more psychological force than others’ reasons, this psychological 
fact is not in itself a sufficient reason to privilege one’s own reasons over those of others; at 
most, it is a fact that eventually will need to be taken into account in order to keep personal 
agency going, or for moral reasons, which again can be argued and shared.
12“If our social nature is deep, in the sense that it is the nature of our reasons that they are public and 
shareable, then justifications of morality can and should appeal to it” (Korsgaard 1996a, 136).
13Gowans (2002, 564) tries to show that identity constructivism cannot adequately deal with the 
epistemic commitments embedded in certain practical identities. He gives the examples of 
languages and religions.
14Compare Korsgaard (2009, 126 and 190 ff.)
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